Source: The Daily Telegraph

As 2025 begins, pessimism about Ukraine’s fate hangs in the air, while the stench of appeasement is in the wind. I find myself reasonably perplexed, because it should be clear that the conflict so far has been a humiliating failure for President Vladimir Putin.

Unable to achieve his goal of subjugating his much smaller neighbor, he has caused immense suffering in his own country, wrecked Russia’s economy and undermined Russian prestige and strategic influence around the world.

Let us not forget that what was planned as a three-day “special operation” has turned into a three-year nightmare. Russia has achieved only limited territorial gains and has been unable to capture even the entire Donetsk region in the east. Last year’s major offensive to create a buffer zone in Kharkiv, to protect Russian territory, managed to take only a few kilometers along the border. The missile strikes, intended to plunge Ukraine into almost constant cold and darkness, have clearly failed.

Meanwhile, Putin has lost control of parts of the Kursk region to Ukrainian forces, in the first invasion of Russian territory since the Second World War, and has failed to retake it even after recruiting North Korea as an ally in the conflict. Putin’s much-vaunted air defenses have proved incapable of stopping Ukrainian attacks on air bases, oil depots and ammunition warehouses inside Russia. Even the capital, Moscow, has been penetrated by Ukrainian-made explosive drones. The Russian navy has been humiliated, losing control of the Black Sea and failing to stop Ukraine’s grain exports. More than 15 of its ships have been sunk by naval drones; many others have been damaged, and the rest of the fleet has been forced to retreat from the Crimean Peninsula and Ukraine’s coastline.

The human cost of Putin’s slow-moving campaign has also been extraordinary. Ukraine estimates that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024 alone. The Institute for the Study of War, an American think tank, estimates that during the same period Russia captured 4,168 square kilometers; that means every square kilometer captured has cost more than 100 casualties.

The financial costs of these losses, with six percent of the entire federal budget pledged to support the wounded and compensate the families of those killed, are just one of the factors contributing to Russia’s increasingly fragile economy. Interest rates have reached 23 percent, with inflation at nine percent, driven by an unstable wartime economy and severely damaged by global sanctions. Russia’s financial system may not be on the verge of collapse, but no matter how much the Kremlin promotes its future, long-term economic stagnation seems inevitable even if the conflict ends in 2025.

In other regions, the war has severely damaged Russia’s credibility in the Middle East. Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 kept Assad in power. But the reduction of his forces there to support the bloody conflict in Ukraine, together with the 2023 withdrawal of the Wagner mercenary force—another victim of the war—meant that he was unable to save the dictator at the end of last year. Whether or not Moscow retains its bases in Syria, its reputation as a strong and reliable ally, compared with the fickle West, will have been badly damaged. Moreover, Russia’s weakness in Syria has caused damage, perhaps irreparable, to its principal regional partner and arms supplier, Iran. If Syria becomes a support base for jihadists seeking to carry out terrorism inside Russia—a clear possibility—this could be catastrophic.

Contrary to Putin’s dream of reviving a Russian empire, he has risked making the country dependent on China. Western sanctions have already made Russia more dependent than ever on China for economic support and trade. As Moscow’s economic situation worsens, the trade imbalance will deepen. Russia also depends on Chinese supplies of dual-use technology, which is essential to its war production. Moreover, North Korea would not have sent 10,000 troops to help in Putin’s war without Xi Jinping’s approval. The conditions are being set for Moscow’s subjugation to Beijing.

Despite Russia’s difficulties, we must not make the mistake of believing that Ukraine and the West are close to winning this conflict. Unfortunately, the opportunity to do so was lost at least two years ago through a combination of Europe’s lack of resolve and fear of escalation in the US, which denied Ukraine the weapons it needed to expel Russia. Ukraine has been unable to stop Russia’s continued advance and will not be able to do so without significantly increased support, which is unlikely. Kyiv’s allies have grown increasingly weary of the war—after the failed 2023 counteroffensive—and many are resigned to a peace deal. President Zelensky’s recent comments suggest that he, too, is now willing to accept one, even if it means territorial concessions.

Putin is taking a hard line, rejecting a proposal reportedly made by the US president-elect that includes a 20-year delay in Ukraine’s NATO membership, Western security guarantees and a European-administered buffer zone. His position may soften depending on how he views the future of the Russian economy and how concerned he is about an unpredictable Donald Trump in the White House.

For now, we should abandon the idea that Putin is “winning” the war. It has been a colossal failure. The tragedy is that the West may be ready to reward Putin with enough territory for him to claim otherwise, turning defeat into victory. /Telegrafi/