By: Sami Behrami

Demographic resources represent one of the most significant and important segments of social development as a whole. A country's demographic potential is assessed according to the size and structural characteristics of its population (biological, economic, educational, etc.) at a given moment, such as the time of a population census.

The primary aim of the 2024 population census in Kosovo was to determine data on the number and spatial distribution of the population. It shows that Kosovo is undergoing profound demographic transformation, heading toward a demographic crisis, especially in the areas of emigration—with a very high emigration rate; fertility—with a rapid decline in fertility; and the age structure of the population—toward demographic aging. Concerns about this have been raised for at least a decade, but have unfortunately fallen, and continue to fall, on deaf ears.

However, three of the facts also confirmed by the 2024 population census, with consequences and a negative impact on every sphere of life in Kosovo, including its future and security, are unfortunately unfolding without any attention from the responsible institutions: Kosovo is shrinking numerically (decreasing), emptying out, and aging.

But what do the data from the 2024 Population Census show? Kosovo is shrinking (decreasing)—the preliminary results published from the 2024 population census show that since the last census in 2011, the total population of Kosovo has decreased by 154,259 inhabitants.

Since in both cases the population census was boycotted by the four northern municipalities, based on the KAS estimates of the number of inhabitants, which also include the four northern municipalities, the total population of Kosovo has decreased by 177,506 inhabitants.

Thus, compared with 2011, Kosovo lost 9% of its total population in the first case and 10% in the second case by 2024. Figuratively speaking, over the last thirteen years, Kosovo has lost as many inhabitants as the combined populations of three relatively large municipalities—Mitrovica, Vushtrri and Skenderaj.

In this regard, it is of interest to see how the population decline is spatially distributed across municipalities, or to determine which municipalities have seen their populations grow and by how much.

In the period between the two population censuses, 2011–2024, depopulation is present in almost all municipalities and areas of the Republic of Kosovo.

This is best borne out by the fact that, of Kosovo's 38 municipalities, 76.3% (29) are characterized by a decline in population, while only 23.7% (9) have seen population growth, of which 8% (3) can be categorized as municipalities with population stagnation, meaning they have seen very little growth. The municipalities with population growth, with the exception of Prishtina and Fushë Kosovë, are the municipalities with the smallest populations, such as Partesh, Kllokot, Shtërpcë and Graçanica.

Population growth in these municipalities may also be the result of greater population coverage in the 2024 census compared with the 2011 census.

The municipalities of Ferizaj, Obiliq and Mamusha can be categorized as municipalities with population stagnation, where population growth ranges between 1–5%. The other municipalities (29) are characterized by population decline, which reaches as much as a halving of the number of inhabitants, as is the case in the municipality of Zveçan (-61%) and Zubin Potok (-49%).

The other municipalities are also characterized by a considerable population decline: 7 municipalities (Deçan, Leposaviq, Novo Brdo, Junik, Ranillug, North Mitrovica and Kamenica) saw declines of 30–39%; 7 municipalities (Malisheva, Viti, Suhareka, Skenderaj, Podujeva, Rahovec and Klina) saw declines of 20–29%; 11 municipalities (Gjakova, Gllogoc, Gjilan, Dragash, Istog, Kaçanik, Mitrovica, Peja, Prizren, Shtime and Vushtrri) saw declines of 10–19%; and 2 municipalities, Hani i Elezit and Lipjan, saw declines of 0–9%.

The accelerating trend in Kosovo's population decline is best demonstrated by the fact that even the municipalities with regional centers are characterized by population decreases, as is the case with Prizren, Peja, Mitrovica, Gjakova and Gjilan. Kosovo is emptying out—as in many countries around the world, emigration statistics in Kosovo are incomplete because many residents do not deregister their place of residence in Kosovo before leaving, or do so long after moving away.

Nevertheless, even such incomplete data show that around 350,000 inhabitants emigrated abroad in the period 2011–2022, a very high number. The fact that emigration has reached worrying proportions is also demonstrated by the fact that, during the 11-year period, an average of around 32,000 inhabitants left Kosovo each year, while in 2021 and 2022 an average of around 119 people left Kosovo every day, or one person every 12 minutes.

In other words, during the period 2011–2022, Kosovo lost through emigration, each year, a population equivalent in size to that of the municipality of Istog.

Even more worrying is the fact that, according to various surveys conducted in the country, around 60% of respondents have expressed a desire to leave Kosovo, mainly younger generations aged 20 to 40, who account for about half of the number of emigrants and form the main demographic and fertility cohort, the workforce, the security cohort, etc., causing a decline in “human capital,” the principal driver of socio-economic development.

Therefore, the continuation of mass departures means that Kosovo is losing not only its workforce, but also generations of young people who would contribute to the country's overall development. Despite the fact that Kosovo is facing a very high emigration flow, more than half of Kosovo's citizens (55.4%) agree that emigration will have a negative impact on future developments in the country; 15.3% agree that it will have no impact; 16.9% say they do not know what impact it will have; while only 11.6% agree that emigration will have a positive impact.

Given the course of events so far, as well as what is expected in economic development, employment opportunities and other unfavorable circumstances, population migration should be expected to continue for some time at undiminished intensity.

Unfortunately, Kosovo's institutions have done very little to address the factors driving emigration, such as economic development, unemployment, prospects for a better, safer and more dignified life, etc.

The consequences of emigration are manifested in every sphere of life: a) demographic (the size of the population, causing the loss of the segment of the population that represents development potential; birth rates; natural population growth; and population structures—demographic, economic, social, ethnic, etc.—accompanied by natural depopulation, brain drain, population aging, etc.); b) socio-economic (low GDP per capita growth, slower economic growth, loss of the workforce, reduced competitiveness and a negative impact on the social and pension systems, emigration of skilled people, etc.); c) national security (in the 21st century, the concept of “security” has changed considerably and is no longer equated solely with military security, but also includes other forms, such as demographic, economic, ecological, political and other types of security); d) the education system (a decline in the number of pupils and students at all levels of education), etc.

The emigration waves of the first quarter of the 21st century are the most unfavorable seen to date. This trend is unfolding amid declining fertility, falling natural increase, a downward trend in the total population, and an accelerated process of deforming population structures, particularly the age structure, toward population aging.

Unfortunately, because of the lack of sound policies toward the diaspora, for now emigration and the diaspora in Kosovo can be considered more of a loss and a threat than an asset and a partner, even though in reality the diaspora is a very valuable asset in the establishment of the state of Kosovo. Kosovo is aging—the fact that Kosovo is facing the phenomenon of demographic aging is best shown by the rise in the average age of the population, which was around 29 in 2011 and reached around 35 in 2024.

This increase in the average age of the population, along with other indicators (which will be discussed below) showing that Kosovo's demographic aging, caused primarily by mass emigration, declining fertility and increased life expectancy, will fundamentally change the way we live, work and build our future.

The very rapid decline in natural increase and selective emigration (the 20–39 age groups account for nearly half of emigrants) have accelerated the population aging process. Thus, while in 2011 the age groups over 60 made up 9.6% of the population, in 2024 this share rose to 16.1%.

At the same time, the 0–19 age groups have shown a decline in their share, from 38.1% to 29.7%. The fact that Kosovo's population is aging is also demonstrated by the population changes by age group in the period 2011–2024: the younger age groups, 0–19, showed a decline of 25.9%; the 20–59 age groups declined by 5.2%; while only the age groups over 60 showed an increase, of 49.7% (they doubled).

Further evidence of this is that, compared with 2011, all age groups from 0 to 39 showed a downward trend in 2024; the 40–44 age groups stagnated, with a downward trend; while all age groups over 45 showed an increase, with the oldest age groups recording much faster growth.

Population aging is accompanied by negative consequences for demographic, economic, social and other developments. To prevent population aging resulting from the predominance of younger age groups in migration flows, it is necessary to discourage the emigration of young people by improving conditions, opportunities, access and integration for young people in vocational training, vocational education, university education in fields sought by the market, and the labor market.

Alongside today's worrying negative demographic trends and consequences, recent emigration trends are increasingly affecting other spheres of life, such as the labor market and the destabilization of the education and health systems; in the coming years, they will also be accompanied by the destabilization of the economic, social and pension systems, etc., for a long time.

In the long term, an aging workforce structure, negative natural increase and the departure of young people from Kosovo will threaten the functioning of pension and disability insurance funds and health insurance, which will not have sufficient funds to finance future obligations.

Fewer young people also means fewer new and innovative businesses, less innovation and technology, fewer opportunities to adapt to labor market demands, and less readiness among the workforce to retrain in line with the requirements and dynamics of the modern economy. Finally, since emigration is the most important factor in Kosovo's population decline, emptying out and aging, the state must act quickly to help reduce the causes that drive emigration in the first place.

Creating conditions so that people, especially young people, can believe in building a future in their own country is key to stopping emigration and the demographic crisis in Kosovo.

Also, to reduce the negative effects of demographic processes on socio-economic development, it is necessary to adopt a range of population policy measures and strategies, measures aimed at making migration sustainable, and a series of economic reforms to revitalize the economy and raise citizens' living standards. These would improve the business environment, encourage job creation, promote investment and restore optimism among young people, which would mitigate and reduce the emigration cohort from Kosovo, turning migration from a negative process into a positive one; stimulate births by extending maternity leave, ensuring regular payment of maternity and child benefits, providing additional incentives and support for the care and education of a third child and every subsequent child, allocating apartments to newly married couples, etc.

It would also be important to run an awareness campaign about the importance and significance of having children through the media and public information channels, rather than the current situation, in which much more is promoted and invested in programs that discourage having children and starting new families.

If immediate measures are not taken to address population decline, emigration and population aging, Kosovo risks entering a deep demographic, economic and social crisis.

Thus, every delay in taking measures to address the issues discussed in this opinion means a deepening of the overall crisis, and, over time, it may be too late to resolve them—which also means emerging from the crisis. Unfortunately, to date, political will to address the issues and concerns raised about the demographic problems presented has been lacking, and efforts to resolve them are, unfortunately, nowhere in sight. The author holds a doctorate in geography and demography