“There are grounds to say that he is already finished,” Žarko Korać, once deputy prime minister in Zoran Đinđić’s government, told the Croatian newspaper Jutarnji list.

From what is happening in Belgrade, euphoria over victory has already taken hold among the forces opposed to Vučić, who are expected to begin celebrating in the streets immediately after polling stations close.

The reason for this is the high turnout, which signals that Aleksandar Vučić is, at least as things appear, falling and that even with extensive electoral manipulation he will not be able to make up for this loss, although he has not left everything to chance either. But this time, he is really in a difficult position.

“The queues to vote are so long, and turnout by midday is around 35 percent, so it can already be said that Aleksandar Vučić is finished,” says Žarko Korać, a retired professor at the University of Belgrade and once deputy prime minister in Zoran Đinđić’s government.

Since the early hours of the morning, the atmosphere has been such that queues began forming even before polling stations opened. When the situation is like this, sociologists say, it always indicates high turnout, which means voters are seeking change. Turnout is heading toward a figure that even Vučić will find difficult to surpass. Nevertheless, judging by the early hours of the election, Vučić seems to need to think quickly about his next moves, because the impression is that things are not going well for him. The fact that many of his media outlets, such as Informer, Kurir, Alo, Politika and B92, are writing about numerous irregularities at polling stations and threats faced by pro-Vučić voters, while students and independent media are being accused of violating the election silence, indicates that a possible tactic of refusing to recognize the election results is already being prepared, on the grounds that they are irregular. Informer, Vučić’s most powerful media weapon, is already talking about these irregularities, which means they are aware of the direction in which the electoral process is heading.

In his “best” days, Aleksandar Vučić received around two million votes, which means that this time he needs at least another 400,000 to 500,000 votes to declare victory. If turnout reaches 65 to 70 percent or more, as expected on the basis of this trend, that means he will not be able to make up the difference. If the crowds at polling stations continue—and it is hard to expect them to thin out—we may perhaps already speak of Vučić’s defeat.

According to some information, in the event of defeat he could provoke unrest and disorder in order to declare a state of emergency and thereby postpone his downfall, at least for a while. Perhaps he will insist that the elections were irregular or claim victory, which the students do not recognize, dragging out the situation and pushing it to the brink of crisis and chaos.

The question is to what extent the police, the military and the intelligence community, as well as his paramilitary squads, the so-called ćaciji, are prepared to protect him, although to a large extent they are also protecting themselves and their positions. However, given his psychopathological authoritarian character and the fact that he has created a nepotistic, corrupt-clientelist regime linked to criminal structures (about which the weekly Radar, one of the few independent Serbian media outlets, wrote shortly before the election), the question arises whether, for all these reasons, he can hand over power peacefully and retreat into opposition. Since he has brought a large number of people into this lucrative system built on loyalty, while still holding the repressive apparatus, institutions and most of the media in his hands, it is likely that he will try to delay the inevitable and provoke chaos and unrest, regardless of the election results.

Nevertheless, if Vučić—and this can be expected of him—declares victory despite such high turnout, that would mean there had been massive electoral manipulation. This will certainly bring large numbers of dissatisfied people into the streets, particularly in major urban centers such as Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš—that is, people who did not vote for him. In this case, the question is how the repressive apparatus, which is entirely under Vučić’s control, will respond. He may accept defeat, but he will do everything to make the change of power difficult, especially if he feels threatened. This means that he will try in every way to prevent the formation of a new government, giving himself the chance to consider whether to flee (in this context, Minsk and Moscow, via Bratislava, are mentioned). This is one of the realistic scenarios, because his opponents have long been threatening him with imprisonment and trial, and it is difficult to imagine that he is willing to make that sacrifice to such an extent.