Author: Gurakuç Kuçi – Senior Researcher at the “OCTOPUS” Institute for Hybrid Warfare Studies and professor at Universum College

State borders have historically served not only as administrative divisions, but also as geostrategic instruments of control and influence. In many cases, to create stable barriers between two political or national spaces, a third ethnicity has been deliberately interposed in border areas. This approach aims to produce ongoing tensions, justify political or security interventions, and create long-term pressure zones.

Such cases are not identical in form, but follow the same operational principle. Russia has applied this model in Donbas, Crimea, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Serbia has applied it in northern Kosovo. In all these cases, demographics, identity narratives and borders function as intertwined geostrategic levers.

These approaches constitute forms of hybrid warfare, built on long-term preparation rather than random actions. Hybrid warfare, in this sense, has made nationalism’s operational function easier, transforming it from an ideology into a tool. Demographics, nationalist narratives and control of border areas constitute a functional triad of this strategy.

The case of Vevçan as a narrative indicator

The case of the Municipality of Vevçan in North Macedonia and the celebrations featuring Serbian national-chauvinist chants should also be viewed in this analytical context. Vevçan is a municipality with an Orthodox Macedonian majority, administratively separated from Struga in 2004, and is located near the border with Albania, around 8–10 km away, with direct geographical links toward Pogradec and Tirana.

In September 1991, less than two weeks after Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia, Vevçan symbolically declared independence through a local referendum. This act was not recognized, but remains an indicator of a local tradition of symbolic rebellion.

Recent developments, however, place Vevçan in a new narrative context. On January 13 and 14, during the traditional St. Basil’s Carnival, a centuries-old ritual associated with the New Year according to the Julian calendar, the Serbian national-chauvinist song “Ko to kaže, ko to laže, Srbija je mala” was heard being sung.

During the 1990s, this song was sung by the Serbian army, police and paramilitary formations during the wars in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its presence at a traditional festival does not constitute direct evidence of an organized Macedonian state strategy, but functions as an indicator of the penetration of an expansionist narrative into spaces in North Macedonia, where such activities are uncontrolled.

From local incidents to a regional amplification model

The case of Vevçan, however, is not an exception. It fits a chain of documented events in the region: graffiti in Kolašin bearing the message “when the army returns to Kosovo,” inscriptions in Budva such as “Kosovo is Serbia” and “he who dies for Kosovo never dies,” as well as openly genocidal chants against Albanians during a basketball game in Kumanovo, including “gas chambers for Albanians” and “Pure Macedonia.”

These incidents are functioning as social amplifiers of a sustained anti-Albanian narrative, which spreads through graffiti, sports, festivals and cultural rituals. This is characteristic of the psychological and social pressure phase of hybrid warfare, where the aim is not immediate escalation, but the gradual normalization of hate speech and conflict.

These developments point to a systematic effort to turn anti-Albanianism from an extremist stance into widespread regional discourse, particularly at moments when the Belgrade regime faces domestic political pressure and international delegitimization. Exporting tension serves as a means of displacing the crisis and testing the limits of regional and international responses.

Albanians constitute one of the key geopolitical factors in the Western Balkans that obstructs the realization of Russian-Serbian hegemonic projects for strategic access to the Adriatic. For this reason, the normalization of anti-Albanian discourse through hybrid means should be treated not as a local provocation, but as a direct threat to public order, regional stability and long-term security.