By: Mero Baze
Sali Berisha was moving further and further away from US policy. His victory in the local elections of October 20, 1996, too, had completed his full grip on power and, at the same time, his drama. He added political enemies in Albania and lost the most important ally in the world, the US.
Pressure to shut down the pyramid companies had begun. The government’s relations with the IMF had deteriorated. His Finance Minister, Ridvan Bode, and the Governor of the Bank, Kristaq Luniku, made statements showing that they were not so loyal to Sali Berisha’s determination not to touch the pyramid schemes.
In this tense situation, the first pyramid schemes were beginning to falter. Convinced that the only way to bring the US back to his side was Kosovo, Sali Berisha invested himself in becoming involved in that battle.
Sali Berisha uses Adem Demaçi against Rugova
Sali Berisha turned his attention to Adem Demaçi, a leader he had ignored up to that point. Demaçi, who had made gestures toward political involvement by joining Kosovo’s Parliamentary Party, was invited to Tirana at the end of November.
The press’s attention to this situation was extreme. As a journalist for “Voice of America,” I tried to interview Adem Demaçi. The problem was that it was impossible to find where he was staying. Kosovo’s representative office in Tirana had no information at all. It knew only that he was Sali Berisha’s guest.
Berisha wanted assurances about the topics of the conversation with Demaçi. He was especially curious whether the idea for an interview was mine or the newsroom’s. Then he offered me one of his guards to put me in touch with Demaçi’s guards. Finally, I was told to go to the former “Vjosa” Hotel (Miniri), a small hotel at the corner of “Skanderbeg” Square. There I was told that someone would give me a phone so I could get in touch with Demaçi.
I waited for half an hour, but no one came. I asked the receptionist if there was a message for me. After asking my name, she said, “yes.” A little later, a tall young man from Mr. Demaçi’s security detail came into the lobby and told me he would give me a phone, which I could use to call Mr. Demaçi in half an hour.
It was taking me an hour to meet someone who had gone into hiding in the middle of Tirana. The phone he gave me was a landline, not a mobile. It seemed familiar because several digits were the same. As soon as the young man left, I called the number and saw the receptionist pick up the phone.
I understood. Adem Demaçi was in the hotel. His “underground” habits had not yet left him. We began the interview in the lobby of the “Vjosa” Hotel.
During the interview, he was clear on two things. First, that the protests in Serbia should be supported, and second, that the government in Tirana had made no mistake by supporting them and criticizing Pristina for its passivity.
The interview was exactly as Sali Berisha wanted it. He called for Kosovo’s parliament to convene, for institutional resistance to be energized, and for the protests in Serbia to be supported. He was diametrically opposed to Rugova’s positions.
Two of his question-and-answer exchanges explained everything.
– Recently, the official press in Tirana, as well as official policy, has been calling on the Albanians of Kosovo to support the demonstrations by the Serbian opposition. Do you share this position?
Demaçi: As you know, I have also sent them a message in support of these demonstrations. The message has met with support and made a great impact, both among the demonstrators and among the Serbian intelligentsia. I think we should support these demonstrations, because the democratization of Serbia is a condition that would enable Kosovo to be liberated at a lower cost and more quickly.
– Is there perhaps a change in Tirana’s official policy toward the current political discourse in Kosovo?
Demaçi: Tirana’s policy has consistently supported the Kosovo movement and Kosovo’s independence, and this policy has experienced very few fluctuations. But recently, Albanian policy—that is, the policy of the Albanian state—has become entirely crystallized. The recent statements by Mr. Tritan Shehu and the latest statements by President Berisha are very favorable and are exactly what is needed to support the Albanian movement.”
He met with Sali Berisha at midday on November 24. Berisha praised the fact that Demaçi had remained “a symbol of our national resistance,” an assessment that went beyond Ibrahim Rugova’s standing in the history of peaceful resistance.
Berisha’s official announcement stated: “He confirmed to President Berisha his opinion on the education agreement, that the problem of the schools could be resolved by the Albanian students themselves,” which implied protest movements by students and pupils in Pristina if the agreement was not implemented. This was also the motivation for the student protests in Pristina in October 1997. Berisha also emphasized his support for the education agreement, “as proof of President Milošević’s willingness to respect what he has signed.”
Berisha meanwhile called for Kosovo to convene its Parliament and for “Parliament and the other institutions to function normally, which would not only fail to complicate matters, but would instead contribute to stability and a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo issue, which constitutes the most complicated factor in the Balkan crisis.”
Support for the Serbian opposition, the effort to constitute Kosovo’s parliament—which had yet to convene—and the formation of legal institutions in Kosovo were the ideas that ignited his silent battle with Rugova. In fact, they were all utopian. Ibrahim Rugova had not managed to keep the deputies from being arrested before they could be constituted as a parliament, let alone convene them. Berisha knew this very well. He was simply telling Rugova, “Do this or step aside, because others will do it.”
The irony was that Rugova would come to Tirana the day after Demaçi. He would go from Albania to Norway, then on to the US for a meeting with Warren Christopher; on the way back, in France, he would receive a medal from the Sorbonne University in Paris. A month later, he would return to Tirana and then to Pristina.
Sali Berisha’s predicament was immense. Ibrahim Rugova, whom he had until then considered one of his allies, was now received three times a year by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, while for months no one had met with Berisha except Adem Demaçi.
The meeting between Rugova and Sali Berisha took place on November 25, a day after Demaçi’s. In the statement from Berisha’s office, it appears that no one touched on the contentious issues. “Presidents Berisha and Rugova emphasized that the commencement of the work of Parliament and the other institutions in Kosovo constitute important factors of stability that contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo issue.” 000000
This was undoubtedly the most difficult sentence for Berisha to work into the conversation. Ibrahim Rugova passed over it without much emotion.
During the ceremony in Paris where he was named “Doctor Honoris Causa” by the University of the Sorbonne, Rugova explained to BBC Albanian why he was not joining in support for the protests in Serbia, as Tirana demanded.
As soon as he arrived in Tirana, Berisha took care to meet with Rugova again. By then, Rugova was the only Albanian interlocutor with the US, and Berisha needed to appear involved.
The statement from Berisha’s office said that “the presidents thanked the US and described as very important the meetings Mr. Rugova held with Secretary of State Christopher, with members of Congress and other senior officials of the US administration, and considered them a consolidation of the US commitment and interest in resolving the Kosovo problem. Presidents Berisha and Rugova emphasized that the democratization of Serbia through democratic and peaceful means is an important positive development not only for Serbia, but also a direct and real contribution to peace and stability in the region.”
Berisha’s press office took care to present them in every instance as “the two presidents,” especially on the point about the protests in Serbia. But separately, their public positions differed. This was clear in an interview Ibrahim Rugova gave to the prestigious French newspaper “Le Figaro.”
Rugova’s final night in Tirana that December was very tense. I myself did not expect things to have gone so far.
When I went back to Villa 31, hoping that this time he would give an interview after his visit to the US, I saw that the atmosphere in the villa’s lobby seemed tense. His companion, Adnan Merovci, had left a guard officer there who would not let anyone go upstairs without notifying him. Bashkim Gazidede was sitting in an armchair a little farther away, furious. I greeted him without knowing why he was there.
– Where are you going?
Then he nodded toward the floor above, as if to say, “to Him?”
– Yes, I said. – I had arranged to speak with him about an interview…
He shook his head disapprovingly. He seemed about to say, “Why bother going to him…”
Ibrahim Rugova was alone in the room, watching television. He gestured for me to sit down. I told him Bashkim Gazidede was waiting downstairs. Perhaps he was there for you.
– I told Adnan I was busy. There are some things I have to deal with at other levels.
From the annoyance with which he spoke, it seemed I should change the subject, while he pretended to look for the bottle of whiskey.
The whole scene in his room, and the tension that the person waiting in the lobby might knock at any moment, seemed intense.
Then the conversation wandered into matters of no real importance.
I saw that I was failing. There was no chance he would give an interview.
– Are you giving an interview to “Voice of America”? I repeated awkwardly.
– No, no! What interview! Glad we saw each other! There, I found the whiskey! Let’s have a drink…
And then the conversation changed completely. I could not bring up Berisha, Demaçi, Bukoshi, or the disputes between Tirana and Pristina.
Berisha’s attempt to hide his conflict with Rugova. How he mobilized students in Pristina against him.
Sali Berisha had sensed the danger. Seeing how widely the conflict between him and Rugova had spread in the Kosovo press, he devoted his entire year-end press conference, two days before New Year’s Day, to Ibrahim Rugova. He did everything possible to make it seem that nothing had happened between them.
“I will reaffirm here, before you, my appreciation for the undeniable and very important contribution of the LDK, as well as President Rugova, to the Kosovo issue,” he said at the start of the press conference.
Then he began saying extraordinarily cautious things, the sort of thing Berisha was never in the habit of saying. It was as if he were sitting an exam before someone.
“I have supported the policy pursued by Kosovo’s political forces, by President Rugova, and I support it again. But those who are elected, when they seek the vote of an oppressed people, must carefully weigh all the honors and consequences of that vote. The constitution of Parliament is an extremely important development in Kosovo’s political life, as is the constitution of all the other institutions.”
His sentence was clear. In a way, he was accusing Kosovo’s leaders of putting their own interests ahead of Kosovo’s by not convening Parliament and re-forming the government. The sentence “they must carefully weigh all the honors and consequences of that vote” was an unmistakable attack.
In my capacity as a journalist for “Voice of America,” I asked for the microphone.
– Some time ago, in this room, you called on the Albanians of Kosovo to abandon maximalist demands, whereas now you are urging them to realize their national aspirations. How do these two positions differ? And secondly, it seems that Adem Demaçi is consolidating a new political bloc in Kosovo in opposition to President Rugova. Do you support this, and what is your opinion?
The first answer was extremely confused. He did not finish a single sentence… “I have said this, and it is true. I have proposed an optimal solution, but not everything that is right is possible. In speaking of an optimal solution, I have never ruled out the best solution that Albanians want for themselves, but this always depends on understanding with the other side. I know of no case in which two countries have separated peacefully without mutual understanding. So, a democratic Kosovo and a democratic Serbia, I am convinced, will make increasingly reasonable decisions, rather than an occupied Kosovo and a totalitarian Serbia. That was the essence of my statement. As for Adem Demaçi, I see no antagonism, as you journalists do. I see no excesses in disregarding the general picture. Demaçi has committed himself entirely to the peaceful movement, so his platform is a civilized, democratic platform, which is in fact based on the principle of a peaceful solution.”
The answer he gave me justified his support for a democratic Serbia, because, according to him, if the Serbian opposition defeated Milošević, they could resolve the Kosovo issue through democratic means—the exact opposite of Rugova’s assessment. Rugova considered the Serbian opposition just as regressive and nationalistic toward Kosovo. He presented the Serbian obsession with Kosovo as a national contest against Albanians.
As for Demaçi, Berisha’s sympathy was overt, and he placed him above Rugova as a public figure. It was clear that the split had taken place.
A planted question read out by a reporter from the newspaper “Albania” made Berisha’s concern even clearer. The journalist asked him:
– From the way you, Mr. President, have reacted to the protests in Belgrade, it seems you hope to settle the Kosovo people’s issue in Belgrade. Have you considered Albanian-Serbian relations, especially relations between Pristina and Belgrade?
These were questions circulated by Berisha’s spokeswoman.
Berisha knew exactly what he was going to recite. He kept his eyes fixed on the paper. “They are protesting against a regime that is undoubtedly the most savage, the most anti-Albanian of all time, against the one that took the rights of Albanians in Kosovo away with tanks. Therefore, if the demonstrations in Belgrade are supported, we must not forget that Belgrade’s students have one or two reasons to protest, whereas Albanians have many more reasons to protest for their rights and freedoms, denied and violated by that regime. And we are not dealing with two geographical entities, one located in South Africa and the other in Norway, but with the same regime. Even if Albanians enjoyed all their freedoms and rights, I think that, in the name of values based on democratic society, we could not fail to welcome the democratic movement in Serbia.”
Berisha went further here. In a way, he accused Rugova of seeking to win the Kosovo issue by sitting on his hands, and repeated the call to support the protests in Belgrade, presenting the student protest in Belgrade as if it were a protest for Kosovo’s freedom.
Then Sokol Olldashi, at the time a journalist for the newspaper “Albania,” intervened, reminding him that Kosovo’s political forces had reacted negatively to Berisha’s position.
“I am not aware of negative reactions from Kosovo’s political forces to the support I have given to the demonstrations and student protests in Belgrade, and I reaffirm that support today. I consider it very well-founded and know that, as a whole, Kosovo’s political forces have expressed themselves positively about this movement.
As for the petition by the students of Pristina… It is a petition which, as the press reports, is addressed to President Rugova. I have complete confidence that the President will treat it with the utmost seriousness, with particular respect for the students… Students undoubtedly constitute the most qualified grouping in Balkan societies. At the end of this century, they have proved themselves to be liberators, missionaries for the liberation of their peoples.”
But if you glanced at the students’ petition, it looked as if it had been dictated by Berisha and handwritten by Demaçi. It was entirely what Berisha and Demaçi were saying publicly against Rugova.
The petition, with around 500 signatures, was submitted to the editorial office of “Bujku” for publication, and the only person who commented publicly on it was Sali Berisha in Tirana. The petition had nine points addressed to President Rugova.
1. We ask the President to insist on taking possession of the school buildings.
2. We call for the constitution of the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo and strongly support the thirty-one current deputies, as well as the first three who called for this.
3. We ask President Rugova to urgently accept Adem Demaçi as a member of Parliament.
4. If Parliament continues not to be constituted, we ask all deputies to resign publicly and apologize to the people for deceiving them, knowingly or unknowingly.
5. We demand an end to censorship at “Bujku,” QIK, and the satellite program of TVSH.
6. We call on political prisoners involved in the LDK and other parties to wake up from their sleep.
7. We call for the relations between the President and the Government to be stabilized.
8. We call for the functioning of the Coordinating Council of Albanian Political Parties in the territories of the former Yugoslavia to be reactivated.
9. We call for an end to the politics of castes, that is, feudalism in Kosovo.
Berisha’s attention to these “rights in Kosovo” showed that he had seriously taken up using Kosovo as a springboard to escape the US embargo against him. He needed another leader there who could create conflict with the US, so that Berisha could become the mediator himself.
But the US was taking it just as seriously, taking Rugova under its patronage and cutting off his ties with Berisha.
The conflict with Rugova, Berisha’s open display of his ambitions to displace him and control the situation in Kosovo so he could use it to rebuild his damaged relations with the US, cost him dearly. A few months later, he would leave power with US support, while Rugova would continue to be the person they trusted.
Sali Berisha ended 1996 by trying to use Kosovo to escape the crisis in international relations, following what had happened with the elections and the deterioration of relations with the US. But the beginning of 1997 rendered everything irrelevant. Events in Albania were unfolding so quickly that Berisha’s moves to delegitimize Rugova, support Demaçi, or adopt the European line of supporting the Serbian opposition no longer mattered.
The speed with which Albania was sliding into the abyss was now becoming a problem for Kosovo. And it seems this harmed Adem Demaçi more than it helped him.
Ibrahim Rugova, whose greatest strength was his failure to react, crushed Berisha’s effort with his silence. Within the LDK, especially among Rugova’s inner circle, a spirit of intolerance toward official Tirana, and Berisha in particular, took hold. But Rugova never gave himself away. He simply ignored the entire situation Berisha tried to create and continued his personal relations with the US.
He was in daily contact with American diplomats about every development in Kosovo, and especially about how this crisis intersected with the Serbian opposition’s battle in Belgrade. A typical example was the tension created after several killings in Kosovo and the American recommendations to Rugova and Bukoshi.
(Mero Baze: The First Republic. The Political History of Kosovo 1989–1999)







