Written by: Adri Nurellari
In a cold, damp Dutch city, thousands of kilometers from Pristina, stands a gloomy concrete building that has set out to determine Kosovo’s political and historical fate. It is neither a diplomatic mission nor an international body of the United Nations, but the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, a structure established under international pressure, funded and controlled by the European Union, located in The Hague and, above all, outside Kosovo’s sovereignty.
The Specialist Chambers have become a symbol of isolation: closed hearings, excessive redactions, bureaucratic communications that nobody understands. This is not witness protection—it is hiding the process from the public. In Kosovo, ordinary citizens have no real idea what is happening in The Hague. Transparency has been replaced by institutional secrecy.
All of this takes place within a structure that is accountable to no one. The Specialist Chambers are accountable neither to the Assembly of Kosovo, which formally approved them, nor to any European Union body that could politically oversee them. They are an institutional island operating in The Hague outside any democratic oversight, with no real mechanism to compel them to proceed at a reasonable pace, be transparent and impartial. This structure, with its way of operating, is unique not for positive innovation, but for its total lack of accountability.
With the way it operates, the court is a tragic déjà vu of the Congress of London. Once again, Kosovo’s fate is being decided far away, in the salons of a European capital, while the transparency and sovereignty of the people of the land fade away. Kosovo’s history is the story of a people who have almost never had their fate in their own hands—but who have never silently accepted this imposed fate. Before the Great Powers gathered in London’s salons in 1913, Kosovo had risen several times in armed rebellion, raising the flag of freedom against Ottoman rule and later against every project aimed at partitioning it.
The uprising of the League of Prizren (1878–1881), the uprising of 1893, that of the League of Peja (1899), the rebellion against the Young Turks in 1910, culminating in the General Uprising in 1912, were not isolated episodes but signs of a people seeking to take their fate into their own hands before it was sealed by others. In the mountains of Kaçanik, in Drenica, in Shala, in Karadak, in the highlands of Rugova and Gjakova, the Albanians of Kosovo faced a despotic empire and later the intrigues of their neighbors, encouraged by the Great Powers, with rifles in their hands and a clear idea in their hearts: to be masters of their own land.
But while the Albanian insurgents fought on the ground, another game was being played in imperial Europe. Far from the sound of gunfire and with no Albanian representative at the table, a handful of ambassadors drew the new borders of the Balkans with cold indifference, just as France and Britain divided the Middle East with the Sykes–Picot Agreement. No referendum, no consultation, no right to speak. A pencil on a map decided Kosovo’s fate.
A decision made at foreign tables denied the Albanian people’s rebellious spirit every right it had won through sacrifice. After this, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes established a full-fledged colonization apparatus coordinated by the Directorate of Colonization in Skopje, with local commissions, loans for Serbian and Montenegrin settlers, and the systematic, violent deportation of people to Turkey and Albania. In other words, a classic colonial policy aimed at changing Kosovo’s ethnic makeup, in which the indigenous Albanians were treated not as citizens, but as a population to be “put in order.” In this sense, Kosovo was not simply a province—it was a colonized territory.
But unlike in 1913, today we are not in an international legal vacuum in which the Great Powers can draw a people’s borders behind closed doors. After the Second World War, a new global architecture was established, recognizing the right of peoples to self-determination as a fundamental principle of the international order. The United Nations Charter (1945) included this right in Article 1(2) and Articles 73–74, turning colonized territories into subjects of international law. In 1960, Resolution 1514 declared that every people has the right to independence, and this principle was reinforced by Resolution 2625 (1970), which elevated self-determination to the level of jus cogens (binding law). It was also consolidated by the two International Covenants of 1966, which placed it in their first article.
These documents created a new world order in which peoples are no longer seen as spoils to be divided by foreign powers, but as actors with the full right to determine their own fate. From “objects” of external decisions, they became subjects of international law, with a recognized voice and legal status. This principle was also clearly confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its 2010 verdict, which found that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was in accordance with international law.
In this light, the establishment of an external, mono-ethnic court operating outside the control of Kosovo’s institutions, conducting closed proceedings and independent of any democratic mechanism, and set to decide on fundamental questions of Kosovo’s history and politics outside its territory, represents a regression from the spirit of decolonization. It shifts legal sovereignty from Pristina to The Hague, recreating, in a modern and bureaucratic form, what international decolonization documents sought to eradicate forever.
However, apart from functioning as an autonomous corporate entity,, the Specialist Chambers have built an indictment that treats Kosovo’s liberation war as a “Joint Criminal Enterprise”—a foreign legal framework that shifts the focus from individual acts to the very nature of the liberation movement. Ironically, this concept exists neither in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo, which this court supposedly serves, nor in the criminal legislation of the former Yugoslavia, under whose formal jurisdiction Kosovo was during the war.
By doing this, the court is no longer merely a judicial body: it has also assumed a legislative role, introducing new rules that have never been approved by the Assembly of Kosovo and developing its own jurisprudence, detached from any domestic source of law. In practice, this turns the Specialist Chambers into an authority that not only judges, but also creates new legal rules, outside any democratic or institutional oversight by the state of Kosovo. When discussing the indictment, it is worth focusing on an essential element of the aforementioned Resolution 1514, the document that marked the historic turning point of decolonization on a global scale. It clearly declared that a lack of institutional or economic development “cannot be used as a reason to delay independence.”
Thus, it clearly recognizes the right of peoples to self-determination, including the right to free themselves from colonial rule using the modest means available to them in their circumstances. This is precisely the principle on which the legitimacy of most liberation movements of the twentieth century was built—from South America and Africa to Asia, from Belize and East Timor to Algeria.
In all these cases, the international community, through the UN and the system of international law, regarded the armed resistance of colonized peoples as part of their legitimate right to liberation, even when these movements had no classical state structures, regular armies or full territorial control. Kosovo belongs precisely to the same historical category of peoples who have fought to free themselves from foreign rule, just like dozens of nations that are now independent states, becoming an organic part of the global decolonization process that has produced 2/3 of the states currently in the UN.
But the logic of the Specialist Chambers’ indictment runs directly counter to this principle. It starts from the artificial premise that the KLA should be treated as if it had been a classic state army—with a clear command hierarchy, effective control over every corner of the territory, standardized military discipline and a perfect chain of command. In other words, as if it had been a functioning state at wartime, similar to Croatia.
But this is a legal and historical absurdity. The KLA emerged as an armed popular movement under conditions of brutal occupation, without state institutions, without classical military structures and under the existential threat of an ongoing genocide. It was an expression of the right of an oppressed people to rise up and use every means available to survive and achieve national liberation—precisely what Resolution 1514 recognizes as legitimate. If we follow the logic of the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office to its conclusion, it would mean that oppressed or colonized peoples have no right to resist unless they have a regular army that is perfect according to NATO standards.
Such an approach would exclude almost all liberation wars of the twentieth century, because most of them were fought in conditions of poverty, with improvised means and without consolidated state structures. Instead of protecting the universal principle of self-determination, this logic uses international law to criminalize the process of liberation. It does not understand the nature of the resistance of an oppressed people, but artificially imposes on it the model of a conventional state army, thereby creating a dangerous precedent: that captive peoples without a state, no matter how oppressed or threatened with extermination, would have no right to fight for survival and liberation. In conclusion, what is taking place in The Hague today is not an ordinary criminal trial, but a quiet effort to rewrite history, to put the very act of liberation in the dock.
If this precedent is accepted, it will not be Kosovo alone that suffers; fundamentally, it sends a very clear signal to every people or liberation movement: even if you succeed in liberating your country, the former colonial powers will never forgive you for this courage. You will be persecuted, accused and delegitimized for decades after the war (as is happening today to former KLA members), a quarter of a century after the conflict ended. This is a quiet but brutal message: you may win the war with a rifle in your hand, but in the cold courtrooms of those powers you will continue to pay the price for your courage, because the old European powers never forget those who challenged their past decisions.
Therefore, The Hague is not the end of a process, but the beginning of a test of a universal principle won with blood: that of decolonization. And Kosovo has no reason to silently accept this historical distortion and violation of principle.







